



A Neo-Rawlsian Approach to Residential Integration 
Kevin J. Brown 
Department of Business, Economics, and Political Science, Asbury University, 1 Macklem Drive, Wilmore, KY 40390, 
USA; E-Mail: kevin.brown@asbury.edu; Tel.: +1 8598583511; Fax: +1 8598583921 
How to Cite this Article 
Brown, K. J. (2013). A Neo-Rawlsian Approach to Residential Integration. Social Inclusion, 1(1), 72-83. 
Acknowledgement 
This Article was published by Librello, Social Inclusion’s former publisher. 
 
About the Journal 
Social Inclusion is a peer-reviewed open access journal which provides academics and policy-makers with a forum to discuss and 
promote a more socially inclusive society. The journal encourages researchers to publish their results on topics concerning social 
and cultural cohesiveness, marginalized social groups, social stratification, minority-majority interaction, cultural diversity, national 




Professor Ulf R. Hedetoft, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
Managing Editor 
Mr. António Vieira, Social Inclusion, Cogitatio Press, Portugal 
Social Inclusion | 2013 | Volume 1 | Issue 1 | Pages 72–83
DOI: 10.12924/si2013.01010072
Research Article
A Neo-Rawlsian Approach to Residential Integration
Kevin J. Brown
Department of Business, Economics, and Political Science, Asbury University, 1 Macklem Drive, Wilmore, 
KY 40390, USA; E-Mail: kevin.brown@asbury.edu; Tel.: +1 8598583511; Fax: +1 8598583921
Submitted: 15 July 2013 | In revised form: 22 August 2013 | Accepted: 23 August 2013 | 
Published: 29 August 2013
Abstract: Over  the  past  40  years,  the  United  States  has  engaged  in  various  policies  to 
integrate otherwise segregated black and white households within a shared space. However, 
little work has been done to fully articulate a moral argument for residential integration among 
black and white households. This paper offers what I refer to as the normative argument, 
which possesses two morally-impelled arguments for residential integration. Since the ethical  
appeal to integrate is often couched in the language of justice, I begin with a framework—
based upon the work of the late philosopher John Rawls—for considering the moral aspects of 
residential  integration.  However,  I  go  on  to  point  out  intractable  problems  related  to  the 
Rawlsian framework that  would fail  to flesh out all  ethical  considerations of  the normative 
argument.  From here,  I  provide  a  revised,  or  neo-Rawlsian,  framework  for  understanding 
residential  integration  which  addresses  the  aforementioned problems.  This  exercise  is  both 
important and necessary for the future of residential mixing, as better understanding the moral  
and  ethical  attributes  of  this  discussion  is,  perhaps,  the  best  means  to  lubricate  the 
fundamental shift from 'spatial' to 'social' integration.
Keywords: common good; integration; John Rawls; liberalism; residential  housing; segregation; 
social capital; social integration
1. Introduction
Today in the United States, the chasm of black-white 
race-relations  remains  evident  throughout  various 
sectors and institutions in society. One area where this 
is most clear is in housing arrangements: white and 
black  households  are  not  typically  integrated within 
the same space. However, within the US, we can find 
several  policies  directed  toward  racial  and  socio-
economic de-concentration over the last 40 years as a 
means to mix communities with the intended outcome 
of increasing or enhancing life chances of low-income 
minorities.
For  example,  the  Chicago  Gautreaux  Initiative  or 
the multi-state  Moving to Opportunity  Program were 
efforts  to  literally  move  low-income  minorities  into 
more racially and economically heterogeneous neigh-
borhoods (what has been referred to as a "Tenant-
Based Approach") ([1], p. 4). The Gautreaux Program 
originated from a series of class action lawsuits that 
were  filed  against  the  Chicago  Housing  Authority 
(CHA) in the US and the Department of Housing and
© 2013 by the authors;  licensee Librello,  Switzerland. This  open access article was published 
under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Urban Development (HUD) where it was alleged that 
the  housing authorities  deliberately  segregated low-
income  African-Americans  through  tenant  and  site 
selection. As a result of the lawsuit, a new program 
named after plaintiff Dorothy Gautreaux was created 
in  1976  that  offered  vouchers  and  rent  subsidies 
allowing for eligible families to move to desegregated 
areas throughout the region. By the year 2000, the 
Gautreaux Program had placed thousands of families 
into  new  homes  (often  times  within  newer,  less-
poverty  stricken  areas).  Planners  were  inspired  by 
preliminary results from the Gautreaux program, and 
this  evidence  informed  expectations  for  Moving  to 
Opportunity. Thus, the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
program was created in the early 1990s as a longitud-
inal effort that used the poverty rate of the receiving 
neighborhood rather than its racial composition as the 
dispersal  criterion.  Families  living in poverty-stricken 
areas were eligible to receive counseling and apply for 
assistance  to  move  to  a  low-poverty  neighborhood. 
The results of these initiatives continue to be explored 
and researched to the present.
Other programs, such as  HOPE VI funding or  Fair  
Share  Housing legislation,  seek  to  renovate  low-
income  public  housing  to  create  residential  mixed-
income and mixed-race housing environments (what 
has  been  referred  to  as  a  "Unit  Based  Approach") 
([1],  p.  4).  The HOPE VI program was launched in 
1992 and facilitated by the US Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. HOPE VI grants continue to 
be  awarded  for  community  revitalization  initiatives. 
Fair  Share  Housing  legislation—such  as  the  Mount 
Laurel,  New Jersey rulings—require that every town 
provide  a  "fair  share"  of  low-  to  moderate-income 
(LMI) housing. This ruling engendered public-private 
cooperation  in  addition  to  cooperation  between the 
suburbs and the cities to rehabilitate urban housing as 
a way of meeting their fair share requirement. 
These  aforementioned  initiatives  differ  in  their 
focus on how they address segregation  (de-segreg-
ation; integration) as well as their target group (race; 
class). Describing the underlying motivation for integ-
ration  policy,  Sociologist  John  Logan  writes:  'neigh-
borhood  integration  has  remained  a  goal  of  public 
policy and popular opinion because it is seen as proof 
of the American ideal of equal opportunity' ([2], p. 1).
One of the major issues related to segregation data 
is not simply where households are segregated from, 
but where they are segregated to. Indeed, patterns of 
residential segregation are often associated with stark 
inequalities  related  to  housing,  education,  health, 
labor  opportunities,  safety,  and  local  resources  and 
amenities. These fundamental features for stability in 
an  advanced  democracy  are  disproportionately  se-
cured by  white  households  relative  to  black  house-
holds  in  a  racially  segregated  nation.  Thus,  it  has 
been concluded that 'Segregation […] is the key factor 
responsible  for  the  creation  and  perpetuation  of 
communities characterized by persistent and spatially 
concentrated  poverty'  ([3],  p.  118).  In  addition  to 
segregation  demonstrating  a  deleterious  effect  on 
housing values for black segregated areas, it has been 
positively  associated  with  increased  unemployment, 
poorer  educational  results,  and  neighborhood crime 
([4],  see also [5,6]).  Further,  segregation  has been 
correlated with lower socio-economic status and racial 
disparities in health [7]. Given this evidence, it is little 
wonder that social and economic outcomes for blacks 
are substantially  worse,  both in absolute terms and 
relative  to  whites,  in  racially  segregated  cities  [8]. 
Authors  Dreier  and  Moberg  (2001)  summarize  the 
problems of segregation and what appears to be the 
intuitive solution: integration.
As politicians and policy analysts revisited the thorny 
problems of  urban poverty  in  recent  years,  they 
seemed to be arriving at  a rare consensus: poor 
people  are  hurt  by  their  concentration  in  large, 
inner-city neighborhoods that further social isolation 
and racial segregation. In this view, it would be bet-
ter to disperse poor people and minorities, putting 
them in closer proximity to jobs, decent suburban 
schools, and safe communities [9].
This, in essence, is at the heart of the integration 
idea. It is the belief that segregation is the cause of 
myriad social ills and integration is a key remedy to 
this problem. 
Despite this evidence and its apparent relation to 
residential segregation, it is unclear that 'integration' 
is,  indeed,  the  appropriate  solution.  Schwartz  and 
Tajbakhsh (1997) advise that while housing policy that 
encourages racial mixing is a recent trend, the effect-
iveness  of  such  policy  remains  questionable  until  a 
more robust understanding of social  benefits,  costs, 
and preconditions can be sufficiently answered. Until 
then, they write, advocacy of mixed-housing will  be 
based 'largely on faith' ([10], p. 81).
Despite  this  skepticism,  most  who  advocate  for 
integration  initiatives  share  a  common  assumption: 
the  underlying  belief  that  'segregation  is  harmful.' 
Indeed, it has been said that 'few would dispute that 
racial segregation and concentrated poverty are ongo-
ing challenges' ([11], p. 7). Thus, the assertion that 
segregation  is  not  good  for  society  holds  nearly 
universal  agreement  among  social  scientists  and  a 
comprehensive  review  of  the  literature  would  only 
serve to verify this claim. Yet the core of the issue has 
less to do with whether segregation  is not good and 
more to do with whether mixing is good. If segrega-
tion  is  the  problem,  is  mixing  the  solution?  Based 
upon  the  empirical  evidence  to  date,  there  is  little 
evidence to definitively support an affirmative answer 
to this question. In their 2010 book 'The Integration 
Debate'—Hartman and Squires describe the segrega-
tion/integration quagmire well: 'this book provides a 
harsh reminder of the grave costs of segregation. But 
it  also  identifies  some  of  the  perhaps  unintended 
consequences that have been encountered in at least 
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preliminary  efforts  to  realize  more  integrated  living 
patterns' ([11], p. 7). 
With this in mind, we might remark that there will, 
perhaps,  never  be  a  unified  voice  as  it  relates  to 
residential integration and mixing. However, this article 
aims  to  offer  a  new vantage  point.  The  residential 
integration discussion has been presented and under-
stood  under  a  guise  of  economic  efficacy  and  the 
maximization of utility in an aggregate social context. 
In other words,  the goals  of  mixing programs have 
sought to improve the welfare and well-being of low-
income minority households in such a manner that the 
benefits  exceed  the  costs  of  such  programs.  The 
intended  outcomes  related  to  integration  programs 
are consistent with this framework, as they seek to 
de-concentrate citizens for reasons of security, better 
homes  and  schools,  job  opportunities,  and  a  more 
equal  expression  of  citizenship.  If  we were  only  to 
view these outcomes in a vacuum, we might rightly 
understand  residential  segregation  as  solely  an 
economic problem—particularly as it relates to matters 
of distribution and, as Elizabeth Anderson describes it, 
participation in society [12]. 
However,  discussions  of  residential  integration  on 
strictly  economic  terms  without  deference  to  other 
moral and ethical considerations can be problematic in 
itself.  More specifically,  if  we understand integration 
strictly through the lens of the existing framework, are 
important ethical questions left to the side? This is not 
to suggest that the utility framework for integration is 
not a moral framework in itself. Indeed, such a frame-
work  has  an  explicit  moral  dimension—one  that  is 
referenced  throughout  related  literature  (particularly 
where intended integration outcomes are expressed in 
terms of justice). Improving the lives of  segregated 
minorities through integration initiatives aligns with an 
array of democratic ideals that are replete with values 
such as rights, equality, fairness, and equal opportun-
ity (values that are often expressed in economic terms 
but are ethically driven). In a technical sense, then, 
the issue has less to do with the presence of ethical 
reasoning,  but  rather,  is  more  concerned  with  the 
nature of the ethical reasoning that may be absent by 
virtue  of  using a utility-based paradigm to evaluate 
integration.
By including a more capacious ethical paradigm in 
this discussion, we have grounds to state that 'mix'—
not  necessarily  'mixing'—is  good.  This  is  important 
because mixing strategies have occurred as a result of 
segregation. They have not occurred, however, from 
the premise that mix is good. Engineered mixing as a 
blunt welfare instrument may indeed be a poor device 
for securing and protecting the welfare and well-being 
of  low-income  segregated  members  of  society. 
However, to communicate the appeal for integration 
strictly  in  these  terms is  to  miss  and even exclude 
important normative features. 
The balance of this paper is arranged as follows: in 
Section 2, I begin by stating two normative attributes 
that are primary in the residential integration discus-
sion. Simply stated, these attributes comprise what I 
shall refer to as the normative argument. In Section 3, 
I  attempt to provide a philosophical  justification for 
this argument. Specifically, I draw upon the work of 
John Rawls as a means to support residential integra-
tion  in  a  more  explicitly  moral  and  ethical  manner. 
However,  while  Rawls  may  provide  strong  ethical 
support for the first tenet of the normative argument, 
his  framework is  a poor foundation for  the second. 
Thus, in Section 4, I offer a neo-Rawlsian model that I 
submit  to  be  a  more  appropriate  framework  for 
understanding and deliberating upon the moral  and 
ethical features of residential integration. I summarize 
the implications of this model in my conclusions.
2. The Normative Argument
Evaluations of residential  mixing have relied upon a 
general  utilitarian  ideology.  Here,  I  utilize  the  term 
'utilitarian' in its most general sense: the maximization 
of utility (the greatest 'good') in an aggregate social 
context (the greatest 'number').  Thus,  to determine 
efficiency,  the  optimal  arrangement  is  the  one that 
provides maximum aggregate utility. 
I submit, however, that the multifaceted nature of 
integration, community, and US race relations are not 
adequately captured in a utilitarian framework, given 
the singular aim of such a framework. This statement 
begs the question: what facet(s) of residential integra-
tion is the utility framework failing to capture? Here I 
offer two primary ethical elements relevant to residen-
tial integration that have escaped the utility framework 
as I  have defined it.  I shall  hereafter  refer to these 
elements  as  the  normative  argument for  residential 
integration.
The first is the issue of societal fairness and social 
equity based upon the presence of enhanced risk and 
vulnerability  occurring  as  a  function  of  living  in  a 
racially segregated community. Simply put, we might 
state that it is unfair when sectors of society are more 
socially or economically vulnerable and 'bear a dispro-
portionate share of environmental risks' ([13], p. 131). 
While the efficiency model may be of great import-
ance insofar as providing the optimal social arrange-
ment for utility maximization, it often fails to consider 
the distribution of this utility. Sen (1997) writes: 'the 
trouble with this approach is that maximizing the sum 
of  individual  utilities  is  supremely unconcerned with 
the interpersonal distribution of that sum. This should 
make it a particularly unsuitable approach to use for 
measuring  or  judging  inequality'  ([14],  p.  16).  To 
summarize, we can describe the first ethical issue of 
the normative argument as relating to considerations 
in social equity.
The second ethical element that the existing utility 
framework  fails  to  address  is  the  trajectory  of 
integration's end. Velasquez (1982) suggests that the 
major drawback to a utility framework is its inability to 
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deal with moral issues ([15], pp. 53–54). This is not 
to suggest that such a framework is amoral or devoid 
of  ethical  considerations.  However,  they  are  ethical 
considerations of  a very specific  kind.  For  example, 
most integration initiatives are born out of a desire for 
enhanced welfare and equal opportunity. While this is 
appropriately  understood  as  a  moral  consideration, 
the  rightness of  this  ethic  is  based  upon  the  con-
sequence  of  the  activity  in  question,  expressed  in 
material terms (i.e., morally appropriate if integration 
equals more welfare). This consequentialist approach, 
commensurate with traditional economic cost-benefit 
discourse,  seems  to  limit  the  full  range  of  ethical 
considerations as it is still conceived under the greater 
paradigm of utilitarianism. Dismissing consequentialism 
is problematic, however, as an alternative motivation 
would  also  aim  toward  a  specific  end.  Thus,  it  is 
important  to  distinguish  between  integration  as  a 
means to promote material ends and integration as a 
means  to  promote  moral  and  ethical  ends  beyond 
economic welfare. To pursue the latter is to ask: 'is it 
right?' in contrast to 'Does it work?' [16] We might say 
that this argument addresses how we  value integra-
tion.  In  other  words,  should  we  have  an  equitable 
arrangement,  albeit  a  segregated  one—is  this  an 
arrangement worth aspiring toward? Is this the most 
morally appropriate arrangement? To summarize, we 
can describe the second ethical issue of the normative 
argument as a pluralistic valuation of integration.
Specifically,  one  of  the  important  features  of  the 
normative argument's second tenet involves the recog-
nition that existing in the same space and integrating 
within  that  space  are  not  the  same.  Karst  (1985) 
makes  the  important  distinction  between  physical 
exclusion  and  social  exclusion,  i.e.,  exclusion  from 
'belonging' ([17], p. 323). While one may be physically 
included  in  spatial  terms,  that  does  not  necessarily 
mean they belong. We might refer to this distinction as 
the difference between  spatial integration  and  social 
integration. While the latter requires the former, the 
former does not necessarily lead to the latter. Later in 
the paper, more attention will be given to this distinction.
On  the  whole,  such  moral  reflection  has  been 
notably  absent  in  the  existing  appraisal  of  mixed-
community initiatives [18]. As discussed, some scholars 
have  critiqued  residential  integration  as  constituting 
nothing more than a 'faith-based displacement activity' 
[19]. In response, we might ask: is there space for a 
normative element in our evaluative framework as it 
relates to residential social arrangements? Can resid-
ential  integration  endeavors  be  substantiated  on 
ethical values or principle beyond what we may hear 
in  common  economic  and  material  considerations? 
While the absence of this line of inquiry in the existing 
literature might leave us skeptical as to the relevance 
of ethics in the residential integration debate, value-
laden ideals and language can often be found in social 
mix discussions. These ideals are best captured in the 
language of justice.
3. Supporting the Normative Argument—
Rawlsian Justice and Social Integration in 
Housing
If our aim is to incorporate an ethical component in 
the integration discussion as identified in the normat-
ive  argument,  such  an  argument  would  likely  find 
support and justification in the field of justice. To be 
sure, utilitarianism proper is not antithetical to justice, 
and further, is considered a form of justice. However, 
as  mentioned,  this  particular  brand  of  justice,  as  I 
have defined it, risks bracketing out the ethical com-
ponents identified as being necessary in our under-
standing of housing arrangements. Therefore, to give 
full support to the normative argument and flesh out 
its contributions relative to the integration discussion, 
it is appropriate to begin with a conception of justice 
articulated against the backdrop of utilitarian ideology. 
The seminal expression of such justice is found in the 
work of  John Rawls.  Jon Mandle (2009) writes: 'al-
though the term "justice" is used in a [sic] many dif-
ferent contexts, justice as fairness addresses a fairly 
narrow topic, although an indisputably important one. 
It is concerned with what we might call "basic social 
justice"'  ([20],  p.  11).  Rawls'  work  is  known for  an 
array of important characteristics, but it is best under-
stood as a response to utilitarian conceptions of justice, 
or what he calls the 'predominant systematic theory' in 
modern moral philosophy ([21], p. vii). He describes the 
brand of utilitarianism he is responding to: 'the main 
idea is  that  society  is  rightly  ordered,  and therefore 
just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to 
achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed 
over all the individuals belonging to it' ([21], p. 22).
Rawls' theory of justice offers a promising ethical 
framework for exploring the inequality of impacts rel-
ative to segregated black and white households. His 
approach is favored as possessing a greater degree of 
'egalitarian criteria' for a system of justice and helps 
to concentrate the 'variety of principles of equity, fair-
ness and justice held and applied independently' by 
'ordering and prioritizing or tradeoff'  ([14],  p. 501). 
Further, his theory of justice provides an alternative to 
otherwise  consequentialist  systems  of  determining 
what should or should not be done—a necessary step 
in the survey of  fairness and justice in  housing ar-
rangements. It has been said that Rawlsian justice is 
employed where institutions 'undertake to avail them-
selves  of  the  accidents  of  nature  and  social  cir-
cumstances only when doing so is  for  the common 
benefit' ([22], p. 2021).
Rawls' theory of justice is based on the principle of 
social contract, or the idea of giving up certain rights 
and liberties so as to enhance social order. However, 
this  social  contract  is  not  necessarily  an  historical 
reality, but rather, it  is an imaginary device used to 
discover our moral principles [23]. The purpose of the 
contract is to elucidate what is just, and moreover, to 
arrange society around just ideals.
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How does one go about determining what is just? 
Rawls proposes that justice be constructed in a neutral 
state where the following question is considered: what 
principles would we live by if we knew we would have 
to live together in a society governed by these prin-
ciples  but  did  not  necessarily  know  our  place  in 
society?  Rawls  proposes  a hypothetical  state  where 
individuals  are  unaware  of  their  natural  abilities, 
place, and position in the social hierarchy of society. 
This hypothetical state is referred to as the 'original 
position'. He writes:
By contrast with social theory, the aim is to charac-
terize  this  situation  so  that  the  principles  that 
would be chosen, whatever they turn out to be, are 
acceptable from a moral point of view. The original 
position is defined in such a way that it is a status 
quo in which any agreements reached are fair. It is 
a state of affairs in which the parties are equally 
represented as moral persons and the outcome is 
not  conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the 
relative balance of social forces ([21], p. 120).
It  is  in  this  equilibrium, according to Rawls,  that 
societal  decisions should be made.  Decision making 
without assuming one's particular standing in society, 
class position, or social status is referred to as the 'veil 
of ignorance' [21]. The outcomes of decision-making 
in this equilibrium should be an acceptable standard 
to  all  parties  for  a  just  distribution  of  social  goods 
such as liberty, income, wealth, and opportunity [24]. 
In  other  words,  if  one had no influence  relative to 
where they were born, what abilities they were born 
with, and what future fortunes they would have, they 
must articulate what kind of society they would choose 
to frame so as to ensure their standing in society and 
opportunities  for  advancement were equal,  fair,  and 
just, and not simply subject to the 'luck of the draw' in 
a social lottery [25].
While there is much to be said about Rawls' theory, 
we  can  conclude  that  Rawlsian  justice  would  give 
support  to  the  notion  of  integrated  communities  or 
social institutions that support integrated settings for 
low-income minority-segregated households who find 
themselves more vulnerable and at-risk in society as a 
function  of  their  segregation.  In  other  words,  the 
Rawlsian exercise would support the first tenet of the 
normative argument by suggesting that we would not 
choose a housing arrangement marked by segregation 
and inequality.  The fact  that  I  may be born  into  a 
society where I do not know my skin color and yet 
must decide how I would arrange housing, leaves me 
open to living in a residentially segregated white or 
black neighborhood. If I were to live in the latter, I 
would be compromising my desire to maximize primary 
social goods, or the attributes that all people behind 
the veil  of  ignorance desire  in  the society they will 
inevitably inhabit. These include liberties and oppor-
tunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of 
self-respect.
It should be pointed out that such a thought process 
is  based  upon  the  belief  that  minority-segregated 
neighborhoods potentially  leave  members  more vul-
nerable and at risk to market or environmental forces. 
To be clear, not all segregation is harmful, and some 
have even argued that segregated enclaves—or 'spe-
cialized  neighborhoods'—are  optimal  in  many  ways 
([19], p. 5; see also [26]). However, these considera-
tions must be weighed with the abundance of evidence 
supporting the notion that residential  segregation is 
socially and economically sub-optimal for low-income 
minorities [27].
In  light  of  the  realities  of  segregated  living  pat-
terns, we might rightly call residential segregation un-
just.  Because  an  unequal  distribution  of  primary 
goods is not to everyone's advantage in this particular 
arrangement, Rawls would suggest institutions should 
be designed in order to satisfy the principles of justice 
forged behind the veil of ignorance [28]. This, in turn, 
would result in redressing the bias in social contingen-
cies as overtures toward equality. Therefore, we might 
properly  understand  efforts  such  as  the  Gautreaux 
dispersal  program,  Moving  to  Opportunity,  HOPE  VI 
funding, and legislation such as the Mount Laurel rul-
ings against exclusionary zoning—all efforts to engineer 
integration through housing—as appropriate overtures 
necessary for the achievement of Rawlsian equality.
At best, the Rawlsian exercise provides strong eth-
ical rationale and support for the first consideration of 
the normative argument which recognizes the adverse 
effects  disproportionately  shouldered  by  segregated 
black households as a violation of social  equity and 
fairness.  When  made  ignorant  of  their  natural  and 
social  contingencies,  rational  and  mutually  disinter-
ested persons in the original position would not choose 
to structure society in such a way so as to leave some 
members more at risk and vulnerable. However, as we 
turn our attention to the second consideration in the 
normative argument, the same degree of support is 
altogether absent.
4. Why Rawlsian Justice Will Not Do Justice to 
the Integrated Housing Discussion
Rawlsian justice, a justice understood as distinct from 
utilitarian  sentiments,  while  seemingly  providing  a 
credible theory of justice to buttress the first consider-
ation in the normative argument, on closer inspection 
reveals  insurmountable  problems—two  of  which  I 
shall emphasize—that stand as an impediment to the 
full  expression  of  the  second  consideration.  While 
there is a wide body of criticism against Rawls' two 
theories of justice, this particular critique has less to 
do with his theory in general and more to do with the 
usage of Rawlsian theory as a framework for justice in 
the residential integration discussion. That is to say, 
Rawls' theory—as it stands—is insufficient to support 
both tenets of the normative argument.
First, a Rawlsian framework can condemn the pres-
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ence of risk and vulnerability experienced by segreg-
ated black households, but it cannot necessarily place 
an intrinsic value on social integration. In other words, 
Rawlsian  justice  can  condemn the  consequences  of 
segregation as morally wrong but cannot praise integ-
ration, in itself, as morally right. 
The second problem of Rawlsian justice concerns 
the origin of his framework as being drawn from the 
liberal  appeal  to individual  rights.  A society seeking 
moral guidance for distributive principles based upon 
the  language  of  rights  has  already  presupposed  a 
certain  conflict  among  members  of  that  society.  A 
'right'  for one citizen is often understood as a right 
against another (e.g. property rights: 'my property—
not yours'). In other words, our rights—important as 
they may seem—reinforce the belief that others exist 
as a threat to my rights,  and not the fulfillment of 
them. Further, this conflict is sustained, and perhaps 
exacerbated, in the appeal to one's rights. This argu-
ment finds a strong expression in Marx, who referred 
to a 'rights-based society' as a 'conflict society' ([29], 
p.  44).  Thus,  Rawlsian  dependence on  one's  rights 
would ideally provide each person the opportunity to 
secure basic liberties, but at the expense of enhancing 
a greater sense of community.
In the context of residential integration, this would 
denigrate one of the more fundamental ethical aspects 
of the integration endeavor: social integration among 
community  members  (in  contrast  to  mere  spatial 
integration). While the scope of this article does not 
allow for more detailed attention to these aforemen-
tioned  problems,  we  can  say  that  both  intractable 
problems reveal that Rawlsian justice undermines the 
cultivation  of  community  and  the  moral  power  of 
solidarity that is inherent in the normative argument 
and  which  is  also  necessary  to  achieve  the  aim of 
socially integrating mixed neighborhoods.
4.1. Thickening the Thin: A Neo-Rawlsian Approach
If  one  accepts  these  arguments  and  agrees  that 
Rawlsian justice is devoid of a certain sense of com-
munity and solidarity—both relationally-based concepts
—then it is worth exploring what the inclusion of rela-
tionship would look like for Rawls and the subsequent 
implications  for  the  support  of  the  normative  argu-
ment in residential integration. I submit that such an 
inclusion does not require a major overhaul to Rawlsian 
theory, but rather, can be envisaged in a minor adjust-
ment of  an earlier Rawlsian assumption. To explore 
this, we revisit Rawls' depiction of rational man found 
in the hypothetical original position.
The independence and self-regard ('mutually disin-
terested persons' behind the veil of ignorance giving 
consideration to their welfare) that Rawls assumes of 
actors in the original  position is the lynchpin of the 
aforementioned  problems  arising  from the  Rawlsian 
framework.  More  specifically,  notions  of  relationship 
and communal cultivation are notably absent in this 
picture of the rational Rawlsian agent. For Rawls, the 
autonomous  features  of  'independence'  and  'self-
regard' are necessary for individuals to achieve their 
own ends. There are two primary arguments against 
such a conception. While this article does not aim to 
give  full  attention  to  both,  I  am  not  the  first  to 
address them as problems within the Rawlsian model 
(for  example see  [30]).  First,  we could dispute the 
idea of an 'unencumbered self'  that Rawls assumes. 
Second, we may dispute whether the existing Primary 
Social Goods (liberty, opportunity, money and wealth)
—endowed to agents behind the veil  of ignorance—
are  adequate  to  advance  communal  conceptions  of 
the good, or the 'common good'.
Agents in the original position are ignorant of their 
eventual station in life, in addition to a host of other 
attributes, desires, characteristics, etc.—that they may 
have. They are aware, however, that they desire primary 
social  goods.  Rawls  refers  to  this  desire  as  a  'thin 
conception  of  the  good'.  In  other  words,  while 
members are not considered thickly constituted selves
—they do at least possess these basic desires. It is at 
this point that we can make a small adjustment to the 
Rawlsian  exercise  by  'thickening'  his  otherwise  thin 
conception of the person in the original position. The 
move from  thin to  thick is a move from the person 
understood  as  an  individual  with  preferences  to  be 
satisfied to  a  person 'whose identity  and fulfillment 
are  inextricably  bound  up  with  relations  and  com-
munities' ([31], p. 143; see [32]). If  we accept the 
terms  of  this  adjustment,  this  will  have  significant 
implications  for  the  support  of  the  normative  argu-
ment and our ethical interpretation of social integra-
tion in housing.
Thus, the adjustment I make to Rawls is a simple 
one: the person in the Rawlsian position, in addition 
to  the other primary  goods they desire,  would also 
desire  meaningful  relationships.  I define 'meaningful 
relationships' as follows: the intrinsic desire for parti-
cipation and membership in social networks consisting 
of the norms of reciprocity and trust whose object is 
the good of another. I understand this addition to be a 
general  purpose  means  useful  for  tempering  the 
existing primary goods in addition to carrying out the 
variety of ends people may choose (whether they be 
of a individualistic or communal nature). Although this 
is a small and simple change, it has significant implic-
ations. This article does not aim to deliberate as to 
each and every change the addition of this primary 
good  may  potentially  create.  Rather,  my  aim  is  to 
focus on the implications that have particular relev-
ance for the normative argument in housing and the 
ethical paradigm of residential integration.
4.2. Implications of the Rawlsian Adjustment
In addition to the range of  questions that assist  to 
determine the final principles of justice for Rawls, a 
rational person, in the thickly-constituted sense, be-
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hind a veil of ignorance would desire three additional 
qualities of the societies they would inhabit:
a. Real, meaningful relationships with others;
b. Cultivation of identity through community and 
interaction;
c. Maximization of security; minimization of enmity.
Before elaborating on these additional qualities, it is 
important to note a distinction often made by social 
theorists  upon  examining  social  networks.  When 
reflecting on human interaction and relationships, we 
might  say  the  distinction  relates  to  answering  the 
question:  'relationship  with  whom?'  Putnam  (2000) 
writes: 'some forms of social capital are, by choice or 
necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclus-
ive identities and homogeneous groups' ([33], p. 22). 
This is referred to as 'bonding' capital in social capital 
parlance. Segregated neighborhoods, school fraternit-
ies, ethnic social clubs—or anything that demonstrates 
the 'reinforcement of homogeneity'—are all examples 
of bonding capital ([34], p. 10). Bonding social capital 
links  groups  that  have  much  in  common,  and  are 
often characterized by reciprocity and solidarity. This 
is different from bridging capital, characterized as being 
'outward looking and encompass[ing]  people  across 
diverse social cleavages' ([33], p. 22). Racially integ-
rated communities, ecumenical religious organizations, 
or diverse work environments are examples of bridging 
capital. Putnam notes that bridging capital is good for 
getting  linked  to  external  assets  and  information 
diffusion. Bridging networks also play a valuable role as 
it  relates  to  cultivating  self-identity  and  reciprocity 
among a wider range of diverse networks. Most social 
scientists whose work addresses social capital point to 
the importance of both bonding and bridging networks 
for  a  healthy  society.  It  is  important  to  point  out, 
however, that the composition of bonding and bridging 
capital for social agents need not be equally pursued. 
For  example,  for  low-income  members  of  society, 
bonding networks will play a particularly important role 
(job  networks,  support  systems,  mobilized  labor 
initiatives, etc.). While bridging capital is important and 
in many cases, necessary, the degree of bonding and 
bridging capital  an agent possesses will  vary in their 
social capital calculus. With this in mind, we may now 
explore the additional qualities a thickly-constituted self 
in the original position would desire.
First,  they would desire real,  meaningful  relation-
ships  with  other  individuals.  This  desire  is  a  direct 
reflection of the newly endowed attribute of meaningful 
relationships, and makes a baseline assumption that 
individuals are not simply sensory beings whose aim is 
to author and fulfill various desires. Rather, individuals 
are  also  relational  and  desire  human  engagement, 
social  capital,  affiliation,  membership,  and solidarity. 
These goods can be achieved through various social 
and  political  institutions  such  as  family,  clubs  and 
sports,  work  and  educational  environments,  shared 
public resources, and neighborhoods.
The desire for a real relationship has implications for 
both bonding and bridging capital.  As Walzer (1983) 
writes:  'the  primary  good  that  we  distribute  to  one 
another  is  membership  in  some  human  community' 
([35],  p.  31).  He  goes  on  to  assert  that  men  and 
women  without  membership  are  'stateless  persons' 
([35], p. 31). Individuals possess the desire to engage 
in meaningful associations and to cultivate a sense of 
belonging  through  group  identity.  While  meaningful 
associations  can  occur  in  a  bonding  or  bridging 
framework, it is bonding capital that is most natural: 
'bridging ties are harder to build than bonding ones' 
([36], p. 280). Moreover, homogeneity often serves as 
the social lubricant for belonging and affiliation among 
individuals [33]. Putnam writes: 'for most of us, our 
deepest sense of  belonging is  to our most intimate 
social  networks,  especially  family  and  friends'—i.e., 
our  bonding  networks  ([33],  p.  274).  While  real 
relationships may occur more naturally among similar 
individuals  (i.e.,  homophily—'love  of  the same'),  we 
should not dismiss the importance of bridging capital 
in achieving real relationships. Briggs (2007) writes: 
'popular discussions of race in America often center 
on interpersonal relations [between white and black]
—which relate so closely to the respect, security, and 
feelings of mutuality we all crave' ([37], p. 264).
Second, thickly-constituted persons in the original 
position  would  (a)  understand  that  their  identity  is 
formed and shaped through community and relation-
ships (not self-derived) and (b) as a result, actors in 
the original  position would not desire strictly homo-
geneous relationships which would minimize the full 
scope of identity cultivation available to them. To the 
latter point, if community and interaction are identity-
shaping  mechanisms,  thickly-constituted  persons  in 
the original  position would not desire a society that 
was segregated and strictly  homogeneous,  although 
they may equally place a limit on the degree of het-
erogeneity they encounter as well.
We might  say  that  bridging capital  would  be  at-
tractive, particularly in a hypothetical state of ignor-
ance,  so as to  ensure  one's  self-understanding and 
identity  were  not  limited  to  one  particular  group. 
While  bonding  capital  is  a  natural,  and  necessary, 
component of any society aspiring to community co-
hesion and social solidarity—there are disadvantages 
when bonding occurs bereft of bridging. Indeed, one 
may appropriately claim that ours is a society where 
bonding  capital  is  disproportionately  higher  than 
bridging capital as it relates to black and white rela-
tionships. Emerson et al. (2001) write:
In the post-Civil Rights United States, the racialized 
society is one in which intermarriage rates are low, 
residential separation and socioeconomic inequality 
are the norm, our definitions of personal identity 
and  our  choices  of  intimate  associations  reveal 
racial  distinctiveness,  and  where  'we  are  never 
unaware of the race of a person with whom we 
interact.' ([38], p. 7).
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Emerson's  quote  describes  our  present  arrange-
ment where the threat of limited identity looms amidst 
an otherwise diverse society. In a racialized society, 
should  one  be  born  white  or  should  one  be  born 
black, the risk is to be limited to the norms, traditions, 
and  identities  that  accompany  that  race.  This  has 
implications  for  path  dependency  and  preference 
formation and therefore limits the full scope of human 
potential and self-understanding. It is here suggested 
that  such  an  arrangement  would  be  avoided  by  a 
thickly-constituted self in the original position.
Limited identity, however, is not the only risk in a 
society where bonding and bridging capital are dispro-
portionate. Thus, thirdly, thickly-constituted actors in 
the original position would desire more security and 
less  enmity.  They would desire  social  arrangements 
that allow for human interaction and the advancement 
of given ends to flourish, unrestrained by the potential 
threat of forces that might jeopardize such goods. Not 
only would they desire the maximization of security, 
they would equally desire the minimization of enmity, 
meaning that they would want to minimize structures 
that incite or exacerbate hostility between parties.
Rawls notes that 'although a society is a cooperat-
ive  venture  for  mutual  advantage,  it  is  typically 
marked by conflict as well as an identity of interests' 
([21],  p.  126).  Rawls'  liberal  conception  of  the  self 
and the existing primary goods he aims to secure and 
utilize to achieve his ends is not only consistent with, 
but may very well contribute to, a society 'marked by 
conflict'. It is such conflict, though, that thickly-con-
stituted persons in the original position would want to 
avoid insofar as it is possible. Again, this has implica-
tions for the importance of bridging capital.
We  might  think  of  the  argument  as  follows—
consider Putnam's proposition:
Here is one way of framing the central issue facing 
America as we become ever more diverse ethnically. 
If we had a golden magic wand that would miracu-
lously create more bridging social capital, we would 
surely want to use it. But suppose we had only an 
aluminum magic wand that could create more social 
capital,  but only of a bonding sort.  This  second-
best  magic  wand  would  bring  more  blacks  and 
more whites to church, but not to the same church, 
more Hispanics and Anglos to the soccer field, but 
not the same soccer field. Should we use it? ([33], 
p. 362).
The issue, writes Putnam, is that if we ignore this 
question, then 'our efforts to reinvigorate community 
in America may simply lead to a more divided society' 
([33], p. 362). There are two relevant remarks to be 
made  about  a  'divided  society'.  First,  it  has  less 
capacity to foster a healthy democracy in contrast to a 
more integrated populace. Gutmann (1998) observes 
that  economically,  ethnically,  and  religiously  hetero-
geneous  associations  possess  a  greater  capacity  'to 
cultivate the kind of public discourse and deliberation 
that is conducive to democratic citizenship' ([39], p. 
358). Similarly, Anderson (2010) points out, 'The ideal 
of  democracy  essentially  involves  relations  of  social 
equality' ([12], p. 102).
Second, a 'divided society' has  greater capacity to 
foster antagonism between homogeneous groups. A 
strong presence of bonding capital bereft of bridging 
capital (closing gaps in social distance based on race, 
class,  culture,  etc.)—while  creating  strong  in-group 
loyalty and membership—may equally produce strong 
out-group  antagonism—i.e.,  animosity  toward  the 
'other' [33]. Putnam warns of the potential for conflict 
among homogeneous groups when bonding, and not 
bridging, capital is the societal norm: 'a society that 
has  only  bonding  social  capital  risks  looking  like 
Bosnia or Belfast' ([33], p. 279). 
We may conclude, therefore, that a society bereft 
of  the  presence  of  bridging  capital  may  serve  to 
ensure that one is born into a society with enmity; 
born into conflict.  We may equally  say  that  such a 
society would not be 'secure.' For the reasons above 
Briggs concludes that 'social bridges resting on inter-
group ties have important consequences for individu-
als and for society, for social equality as well as for 
democracy' ([37], p. 265).
4.3. Spatial Implications of the Neo-Rawlsian Exercise
If we were to accept that relationally-based persons 
(desiring 'meaningful relationships'), behind a veil of 
ignorance would desire the aforementioned attributes, 
there are very real spatial implications. Where the first 
feature  (real  relationships)  would  technically  only 
require bonding networks for its realization in society, 
the  desire  for  a  full  range of  social  expressions  by 
which to build and shape one's identity would require 
what  has  been  referred  to  as  'bridging  capital'—or 
associations  that  'bridge'  across  diverse  groups  of 
people  creating  heterogeneous  social  networks.  To 
realize this desire in the basic structure, institutions 
should  lubricate  the  grounds  for  contact  among 
differing individuals on levels such as race, class, or 
culture.  As  mentioned,  an  appropriate  arrangement 
for  enhanced  contact  would  likely  involve  housing. 
Neighborhoods  offer  a  natural  platform  for  social 
intercourse through increased contact, shared amenit-
ies  and  goods,  and  collective  responsibility.  Such 
diversity offers a practical means by which to widen 
my  self-identity  and  understanding,  in  addition  to 
establishing norms of trust and reciprocity along more 
diverse lines. Conversely, a segregated neighborhood 
may serve to limit my ability to aspire to a healthy 
balance  of  self-understanding  and  personality  as  I 
would  be  limited  to  social  development  within  a 
limited, and potentially rigid, environment. There are 
social  consequences  for  such  an  arrangement,  as 
Stolle et al. (2008) write: '…social interactions among 
homogeneous individuals may actually make it much 
harder—or even impossible—for individuals to transfer 
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their in-group trust to the outside world' ([40], p. 60). 
Not only would being born in a homogeneous com-
munity limit my own self-identity, understanding, and 
potential—but it would make it very difficult to socially 
navigate an increasingly diverse world.
Thus,  the second implication of the neo-Rawlsian 
exercise  would  likely  support  residential  integration. 
The  support  of  integrated  neighborhoods  on  racial 
terms will have natural implications for socio-economic 
and  cultural  integration  as  well.  Thickly-constituted 
selves would desire  the opportunity  to  identify  with 
different races so as to have a fuller understanding of 
themselves and human beings in general. As Putnam 
writes:  'social  distance  depends…on  social  identity: 
our sense of who we are. Identity itself is socially con-
structed and can be socially de-constructed and re-
constructed' ([41], p. 159). Navigating through iden-
tities,  or  what  Putnam refers  to  as  the  'intentional 
transformation of identities' requires a 'dynamic and 
evolving  society'  ([41],  p.  159).  Thus,  exposure  to 
different races in an integrated neighborhood setting 
provides a full palette of social expressions by which 
to  identify  myself  with,  which allows me to re-con-
struct  my  own  identity.  Putnam  offers  a  practical 
advantage  to  this  social  flexibility:  '…adapting  over 
time, dynamically, to immigration and diversity requires 
the reconstruction of social  identities, not merely of 
the  immigrants  themselves  (though  assimilation  is 
important), but also of the newly more diverse society 
as a whole (including the native born)' ([41], pp. 159–
160). In a society of ever-changing ethnic and racial 
composition—flexibility is  a necessary attribute since 
'the most certain prediction that we can make about 
almost  any  modern  society  is  that  it  will  be  more 
diverse a generation from now than it is today' ([41], 
p. 137).
Third,  and  finally,  thickly-constituted  persons  be-
hind a veil of ignorance would desire to maximize se-
curity and minimize enmity. The connection between 
space and conflict is easily visible and the examples 
are legion. Persons in the original position may offer 
the following question: 'if I was unaware of my race, 
religion, ethnicity, culture, gender, etc.—would I want 
to enter a world where I could be born  into conflict 
with  a  distinct  person  or  group?'  For  example,  an 
African American born  into  southern  US territory  in 
the mid-1800s is born into conflict  with white land-
owners.  Equally  so,  being  born  into  gang  territory, 
political territory, or border territory among rival ethni-
cities or cultures is to inherit a conflict with a distinct 
'other' upon entering the world. This is not to suggest 
that segregation always causes tension, but to point 
out that spatial tension is evident in residentially se-
gregated areas as well.
As these examples make clear, the 'other' is often 
defined  in  spatial  terms.  However,  this  does  not 
presume that space is the problem—only a mechan-
ism of  identification.  Indeed,  it  would  be  wrong to 
assume that  enmity  is  absent  in  integrated  spaces. 
Moreover,  tension  within  an  integrated  space  may 
actually  lead  to  spatial  segmentation,  suggesting  a 
mutual  causality  between  tension  and  segregation 
(segregation  can  produce  tension,  but  tension—
sometimes  originating  from 'integrated'  spaces—can 
produce  segregation).  Related  to  this,  consider  the 
remarks of Stolle et al. (2008):
A growing body of evidence suggests that localities, 
neighborhoods, regions or states and even countries 
with more ethnic, racial and socio-economic diversity 
experience  substantially  more  problems  with  the 
creation of various kinds of social capital, coopera-
tion, trust and support necessary for collective ac-
tion critical to social welfare programs ([40], p. 57).
There are two points to reflect upon here. First, if 
there is enmity within space (i.e., integrated space), 
then it does not necessarily follow that segregation is 
the solution. This may only make tensions worse by 
establishing a defined 'we' in conflict with a defined 
'them' and exacerbating out-group hostility.  Second, 
as mentioned, we should not presume that space is 
the  problem.  Rather,  it  may  be  a  symptom  of  the 
problem, which is better understood as the absence of 
healthy contact thus creating more fear and a lack of 
rationality. We can remark, however, that space and 
spatial integration is a part of the solution—although 
not the direct solution. If thickly-constituted agents in 
the  original  position  desire  the  maximization  of 
security and the minimization of enmity—then we may 
say that they desire an integrated society constituted 
by  shared  norms  and  collective  mindfulness  and 
responsibility. The achievement of integration of this 
sort requires, as a baseline, shared space and close 
proximity. This is a necessary overture toward harmo-
nious community relationships so as to introduce new 
social  dynamics necessary for  healthy integration to 
occur. We may conclude, therefore, that this feature 
also supports the cultivation of bridging networks and 
would  equally  support  residential  integration  as  a 
means of achieving this strand of social capital.
5. Conclusions
To solely explore the economic implications of segreg-
ation/integration is to risk missing a larger moral and 
ethical dimension. As mentioned, this is not to suggest 
that an economic dimension is devoid of moral consid-
erations.  Rather,  this  paper  has  argued for  a  more 
capacious moral argument as it relates to our social 
arrangements (normative argument). These elements 
include (a) considerations in fairness and social equity 
as  well  as  (b)  considerations  as  to  the  essence  of 
integration.
Further, this paper has endeavored to give philo-
sophical support to the normative argument by utiliz-
ing  a  Rawlsian  framework.  This  framework,  it  has 
been argued, is sufficient to support the first feature 
of the normative argument (social equity), but insuffi-
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cient to support its second feature (essentialist argu-
ment for integration). To maintain the integrity of the 
first argument while giving additional support for the 
second,  a  neo-Rawlsian  framework  was  suggested, 
where agents behind a veil of ignorance were 'thickly' 
constituted with a desire for meaningful relationships 
(in  addition  to  their  desire  for  other  primary  social 
goods).
Some will likely question the nature of this exercise, 
as  Rawls'  original  'thinly'  constituted agent  behind  a 
veil  of  ignorance  would  only  desire  primary  social 
goods  such as  liberty,  wealth,  and opportunity  that 
would  allow  them to  choose  their  social  networks. 
Moreover,  it  is  likely  that  some  would  argue  this 
exercise infringes upon, or de-emphasizes, choice as 
an  important  feature  of  a  liberal  democracy.  For 
example,  Imbroscio  (2004)  presents  a  case  for  the 
liberty  of  'choice'  in  the  context  of  place  with  the 
underlying notion that choosing where one wants to 
live is a fundamental freedom and remains a positive 
human right for  all  human beings [42].  Specifically, 
Imbroscio  supports  what  has  been  referred  to  as 
'community  integrity'  ([43],  p.  595).  Integrity,  in 
contrast to the goal of integration, upholds the right 
to travel or stay put as a tenet of the US constitution 
and as the 'fabric of American life' ([44], p. 578). This 
notion,  which  would  likely  garner  support  from the 
original  Rawlsian exercise,  promotes  spatial  equality 
above  any  attempts  to  engineer  integration:  'real 
freedom of residential choice should be conceived of 
as dyadic, expanding both the exit/entry opportunities 
for the urban poor as well as possibilities to stay put; 
it  should,  consequently,  be  constituted  by  policy 
efforts to facilitate mobility as well as efforts to make 
inner  cities  more  livable'  ([45],  p.  123).  In  other 
words, instead of supporting integrated environments, 
respecting individual rights would require the primacy 
of spatial equality and choice for all social agents.
While much can be said in relation to choice, a few 
cursory responses are necessary. First, as this paper 
has pointed out, engineered mixing (spatial  integra-
tion)  is  distinct  from organic  mixing (social  integra-
tion). In other words, 'mix' may be good, but it doesn't 
follow that 'mixing' is good. Even if one accepts the 
terms of the neo-Rawlsian exercise, this still requires 
thoughtful  consideration  as  to  how  integrated  ar-
rangements are arrived upon. Steps can be taken to 
fertilize the grounds for spatial  mixing patterns, but 
this is altogether different from a forced arrangement. 
Thus,  choice should always be a feature of  healthy 
social engagement—but this does not prohibit us from 
reflecting upon our choices and how they are arrived 
upon.
Second, and related, the primacy of choice is the 
primacy  of  preference.  However,  where  do  those 
preferences originate from? Economists are primarily 
concerned with the consequences of our preferences, 
but not necessarily their origin (preference formation). 
Our preferences,  desires, and choices are,  however, 
conceived  and  developed  within  a  certain  environ-
ment. Living within a segregated arrangement is likely 
to breed preferences that reinforce segregation (re-
ferred to earlier as path dependency). 
Finally, the expression of one's preference still does 
not  make  that  particular  preference  immune  from 
moral  evaluation.  For  example,  the  preference  for 
participation in a hate group (e.g., the KKK) is hardly 
a morally superior arrangement—even though it could 
be rightfully described as an expression of 'choice'.
These  points  support  the  usefulness  of  the  neo-
Rawlsian exercise, as thickly constituted agents reflect 
the value and importance of relationships for human 
beings, but still allow for deliberation behind a veil of 
ignorance.  This  does  not  de-emphasize  choice  or 
human  freedom in  society  (attributes  supported  by 
the Rawlsian framework). However, it does recognize 
that—in  an  abstract  'original  position'—bonding  and 
bridging networks would be an attractive attribute of 
the social  landscape we might later inhabit, and this 
has implications for how we might consider integration.
To summarize the two aforementioned features and 
their spatial implications—space is a necessary com-
ponent for real relationships, a more comprehensive  
setting for identity formation, and for the maximiza-
tion  of  security  and  the  minimization  of  enmity. 
Moreover, among other things, the spatial implications 
of  the  aforementioned  features  allow  for  a  more 
concise  statement  that  thickly-constituted  agents  in 
the original  positions would likely  agree upon: they 
would desire a society that is socially integrated. This 
term, introduced earlier, makes the important distinc-
tion that proximity does not equal acceptance or that 
shared  space  does  not  equal  inclusion.  In  other 
words, spatial integration does not equate with social 
integration. Thus, where spatial integration may refer 
to close proximity and shared space—social  integra-
tion refers to close proximity, shared space, and inclu-
sion,  or  the  idea of  social  assimilation  where trust, 
cooperation,  and  collective  responsibility  define  the 
norms of such membership.
Spatial segregation may be a problem or even the 
problem—but it  does  not  follow that  integration,  in 
general, is the solution. The answer lies in the kind of 
integration we want (social; not simply spatial). Social 
integration is much more morally thick and ethically 
charged understanding of integration. Could it be that 
our  failure  to  discuss  integration  in  these  terms 
(ethical terms) has reinforced the problem of segrega-
tion and our attempts to integrate? Could it be that 
communicating the problem of segregation solely on 
the terms of utility and economic efficacy has stripped 
the idea of social integration of its ethical flavor and, 
in doing so, has redefined the norms of integration 
leaving us to ask the wrong questions? If the impetus 
to integrate originated from the premise that 'mix' is 
good  (i.e.,  ethically  right  and  morally  appropriate), 
might this change how we think about, conduct, and 
measure mixing overtures?
81
This article has argued that a fundamental shift in 
our social  ethos is necessary to lubricate a pathway 
where social, not simply spatial, integration can occur. 
This begins, it is suggested, with framing the argument 
in ethical, in addition to economic, terms. Integration 
as  an  ethically  right  and  socially  just  feature  offers 
moral rationale as to why residential mixing would be 
an appropriate social  desire worthy of  pursuit.  How-
ever, when the argument is communicated solely in the 
language of the economic paradigm, we change the 
norms of the argument and important ethical consider-
ations and features are lost in the translation. Efficiency 
is an important consideration, but not at the expense of 
larger moral considerations.
Therefore,  given the  relational  nature of  humans 
and the communities they inhabit in a society, a more 
appropriate approach to the larger residential integra-
tion discussion would be to invite ethical deliberation 
into the discussion. An ethical dimension is important
—we may even say  necessary—to achieve the social 
integration (where mix is both a means to an end and 
an end in itself) that engineered or 'imposed' efforts 
can  only  aspire  to.  Citizens  who  find  themselves 
morally  impelled  by  the  ethical  argument to  mix—in 
addition  to  conditions  that  fertilize  the  grounds  for 
integration to occur—may best cultivate the necessary 
means  that  allow  for  an  organic  progression  of 
residential, and more importantly, social integration.
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